Abstract. -When sixteenth-century Spanish intellectuals began to debate the legitimacy of the conquest of the New World, they did so in terms of the legal justifications for conquest that had been developed since the mid-thirteenth century by canon lawyers in the course of developing a theory of universal papal jurisdiction. Alexander VI's Inter caetera, Vitoria's De Indis, and similar documents continued and extended this legal tradition. Even Hugo Grotius's work rested on the work of the canonists. In effect, from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries there was a line of legal thought that was developing a conception of an international order and an international law that was an alternative to that developed by Grotius and those who succeeded him.
He asserted that "the Spanish conquest of America was far more than a remarkable military and political exploit; [...] it was also one of the greatest attempts the world has seen to make Christian precepts prevail in the relations between peoples." 2 Hanke's view ran counter to the traditional "Black Legend" approach to the Spanish conquest of the Americas, that is the judgement that everything that the Spanish did in the Americas was evil. That being the case, it was easy to reject the treatises of the Spanish writers who criticised either the theoretical legitimacy of the conquest or the practical consequences of the actions of the conquistadores. Such treatises were either the impractical sputterings of impotent intellectuals or a kind of pious balm applied to the tender consciences of kings engaged in bloody conquests. In either case, this literature was of no great intellectual significance. In attempting to correct the traditional view of the evils and hypocrisy of the Spanish conquest of the Americas by emphasising the significance of the Spanish debate, Hanke was accused of creating a White Legend, painting the Spanish in too favourable a light by placing too much emphasis on what the intellectuals claimed the Spanish intended to do and too little on the realities of the conquest. 3 Admittedly, there was a great gulf between the announced policies of the Spanish monarchs and the theories of intellectuals on the one hand and the actual practice of Spanish conquistadores in the Americas on the other. After all, early modern European rulers were far from able to implement all of their plans for royal centralisation of government within their kingdoms. They were even less able to implement their plans for the governance of the New World. This does not mean, however, that the ideas about relations between Christian societies and non-Christian ones that the sixteenth-century Spanish thinkers developed in response to the discovery of the New World were of no value or significance, any more than Machiavelli's ideas are invalidated by his failure to regain office after his dismissal. In fact, the debate about the legitimacy of the conquest of the Americas was one of the most important stages in the development of modern political and legal thought, precisely because it was the first large-scale theoretical discussion of the nature of relations between European and non-European societies. It was therefore an important stage in the development of legal theories of world order, that is, it provided the theoretical basis of virtually all subsequent discussions of world order and international law in the western world.
Dismissing the Spanish debate about the legitimacy of the conquest of the Americas as insignificant or irrelevant has a long history. One of the earliest critics of the debate and the medieval tradition from which it emerged was Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who argued that the work of the Spanish thinkers, indeed that of all of his predecessors, was unsatisfactory because it was unsystematic and incomplete.
4 By making this judgement and then producing what he claimed was a systematic discussion of the basic elements of international law and relations, Grotius set the terms of any discussion about the origins of international law, identifying his own work as the beginning of all serious thought on international law. 5 One consequence of this was that Grotius deflected subsequent scholars from close examination of earlier writers, especially the sixteenth-century Spanish writers and their medieval forerunners. In taking this stance, Grotius was echoing a common opinion that medieval scholastic thought, the dominant intellectual force in early modern Spanish universities, was irrelevant to the modern world. Grotius was following the lead of the humanists and reformers who had long argued that culturally and spiritually the Middle Ages were a wasteland, a Dark Age, that only ended with the Renaissance and the Reformation. Seen in this light, any medieval writings on international law and relations as well as the sixteenth-century Spanish treatises rooted in that tradition could not be of any value to lawyers and philosophers who were beginning to wrestle with the legal issues associated with the notion of world order.
It is also possible, however, to place the revival of learning and of civilised existence in the wake of the collapse of the Roman world as far back as the eleventh century, a position that the first historian of the Americas, William Robertson (1721-1793), took. He identified European revival with the crusades that brought Europeans into contact with the wider world and began a process of cultural development that eventually led to the formation of the modern world.
6 Seen in this light, the sharp break between the Middle Ages and the modern world that the humanists, the Protestant reformers, and Hugo Grotius perceived fades to be replaced by a strong sense of the continuities between the medieval and the modern. Thus the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the development of international law appear become part of an evolving cultural tradition that looks Janus-like back to the Middle Ages and forward to the modern world.
Another way of reconciling the medieval and the early modern eras is to argue that the period 1300-1800 forms a coherent period, the basis for a recently established journal, The Journal of Early Modern History (1997) . While the stated purpose of this journal is to encourage comparative studies in the age of European expansion, providing "a new framework for cultural contacts and collective self-definitions" and also "a theory of modernisation", it also can serve to provide a forum for consideration of the relationship between the Middle Ages and the modern world, seeing the period 1300-1800 as a bridge linking the medieval and the modern worlds, not a chasm dividing them.
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If we accept the notion that there was no sharp break between the medieval and the modern eras, then the age of European expansion after 1492 appears in a different light, one that emphasises the continual process of European expansion and the concurrent development of legal, philosophical, and theological thought about the nature of Christian society's relations with non-Christian societies from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. The conquest of the Americas in turn becomes part of a centuries-old experience of European expansion, placing Columbus at the mid-point between medieval and modern expansion. In similar fashion, the Spanish debate about the conquest of the Americas and the early development of modern international law, beginning with Grotius, become parts of a legal tradition that had already been in process for three centuries.
Once the continuity of European development from the eleventh (or the fourteenth) century to the eighteenth is recognised, two lines of current medieval scholarship become very relevant. The first of these, to be touched on only briefly here, is the development of interest in medieval expansion and its relation to post-1492 expansion. The second area of current interest that concerns the legal history of the debate about the conquest of the Americas is the study of medieval canon, that is ecclesiastical, law. In the past forty years, a number of scholars, Stephan Kuttner, Walter Ullmann, Brian Tierney, and their students in particular, have emphasised the importance of medieval thought, especially that of the medieval canonists, in the development of modern political and legal thought. Specifically, this work has pointed out that those who debated the legitimacy of the conquest of the Americas from Vitoria to Grotius did so in terms derived from the medieval canon lawyers.
As to the first area of current research, in recent years there has been increasing interest in what might be termed medieval frontier studies, that is, examining what one scholar termed the "internal" as well as the "external" colonisation of Europe.
8 While this research recognises the links between medieval and early modern European expansion, it begins by considering the expansion of European culture from its heartland, a process that began around the year 1000, and examines it in terms of its implications for medieval European development as well as its significance for the post 1492 period of expansion. More recently, Robert Bartlett and J. R. S. Phillips, have emphasised that expansion has been a continuous process since the eleventh century and that European adventurers, merchants, and missionaries had been moving constantly beyond the boundaries of Europe for centuries. 9 The experience of the Spanish in the New World, for example, was thus a logical continuation of medieval Spanish, especially Castilian, expansion, the Reconquista, the war of recuperation against the Muslim conquerors of Visigothic Spain. 10 The same would hold true for the other European powers that engaged in overseas expansion as well. After all, the Portuguese overseas empire began with the Portuguese reconquest of territory from the Muslims, followed by the seizure of Ceuta in North Africa (1415) and then by exploration and settlement of the west coast of Africa and of the adjacent island chains such as the Azores, Cape Verde, and Canary, in the fifteenth century. Likewise, English overseas expansion can be said to have begun with the English entry into Ireland· in the twelfth century, part of a general Anglo-Norman advance along the Celtic frontier, a colonising effort that was re-energised in the sixteenth century.
11
Medieval contacts with non-Christian societies were not only military, however. There were a variety of peaceful contacts with nonChristian societies as well. There was, for example, a great deal of trade with the Muslim world and there were peaceful missionary and diplomatic contacts with the Mongols that provided medieval lawyers with some opportunities to wrestle with issues raised by peaceful contacts with non-Christian societies.
12 There was, for example, some discussion on the nature of legitimate marriage because of the conversion of members of polygamous societies, especially Muslims. 13 This experience along with consideration of the legal nature of relations with non-European societies provided the theoretical foundations upon which Europeans built as they expanded overseas after 1492. Indeed, the ease with which Europeans moved from within Europe itself to expansion along the edges of Europe to their entrance into the New World may have blinded them to the fact that the New World was not just like the Old World, although perhaps at an earlier stage of political and social development and that the medieval experience of expansion was not necessarily applicable to the New World.
14
The second area of current interest among medievalists that relates to the early modern world is the study of medieval canon law and its relation to early modern political and legal thought. Specialists in this field, especially Brian Tierney, have argued that theories of representative government, of sovereignty, of human rights, to name just a few concepts that are routinely associated with modern political thought, were clearly rooted in medieval thought, especially the thought of the medieval canonists. 15 This stands in contrast to the work of Lewis Hanke and those who followed his lead, work that has tended to stress the importance of sixteenth-century philosophers and theologians such as Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez who formed the School of Salamanca, the centre for an important revival of medieval scholastic philosophy. 16 Much of this scholarship has pointed to Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) as the source of the ideas that shaped the sixteenth-century debate about the legitimacy of the conquest.
17
Because the major emphasis of this line of scholarship has been on the sixteenth-century debate, however, the presumed medieval roots, especially the presumed Thomistic roots, of the discussion have been assumed but rarely analysed. 18 More careful analysis of the sources of the sixteenth-century debate, however, would reveal that much of the material of the sixteenth-century debate originally came not from the philosophical or theological traditions but from the canon law tradition. The sixteenth-century philosophers and theologians were often eclectic, drawing on a variety of sources, philosophical, theological, and legal when they addressed the problems associated with the conquest of the Americas. Furthermore, because medieval historians have generally not been much interested in the theory of relations between Christian societies and non-Christian ones, the medieval roots of sixteenthcentury theories of Christian relations with non-Christians have largely gone unexamined by those scholars who are in the best position to examine them.
19
That the canon lawyers played a role in shaping the debate about the conquest of the New World is not an entirely new concept. It was suggested by several writers around the end of the nineteenth century and can be found in the work of mid-twentieth-century scholars such as J. H. Parry and Garrett Mattingly. These discussions rested on a small sample of canonistic material, however, and, as a result, led to some erroneous conclusions. 20 Mattingly was close to the truth, however, pointing out that the roots of the debate were in the writings of the medieval canonists, but he provided little specific information about how this happened. Extensive scholarly interest in the writings of the canonists developed only in the post World War II era. 22 While much of the work has focused on editions of unpublished legal treatises and commentaries, some scholars have examined the connections between late medieval canonistic theories of church government and early modern theories of secular government. This work in turn provided a new context within which to consider the debate about the conquest of the Americas. Rather than seeing it as a sixteenth-century phenomenon, a novel creative intellectual response to the discovery of the New World, placing the debate about the conquest within the development of a line of legal thought stretching from the thirteenth century to the seventeenth, the debate takes on a new significance. In the first place, it becomes part of a larger debate about the relation between the Middle Ages and the modern world, particularly about the relation of medieval expansion to early modern overseas expansion. In the second place, by re-examining the debate about the Americas in terms of its medieval legal roots, it is linked to the larger debate about the development of political and legal thought in the early modern era. In the third place, emphasising the legal as opposed to the philosophical roots of the debate about the Americas, suggests the importance of re-examining the origins of international law, in particular reconsidering the pre-grotian period of the development of that law and re-considering the relationship of Grotius to his predecessors.
The first point to consider in examining the medieval roots of sixteenth-century thought on the legitimacy of the conquest is the place of legal studies in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Spanish universities. The implication of much of the work on the Second Scholasticism and the School of Salamanca is that the discussion of the conquest was primarily the work of theologians and philosophers. This is a position that to some extent rests on Vitoria's observation that the issues involved were too important to be left to lawyers because such issues were moral and pastoral in nature. 23 This comment should not be over emphasised, however. Vitoria clearly drew quite heavily on the legal tradition. Furthermore, while it is true that philosophy and theology were important disciplines in Spanish universities, Richard L. Kagan has pointed out that Spanish universities saw "a steady shift, beginning in the middle years of the 16th century, away from the study of arts and theology to the study of law, particularly canon law [my emphasis, JM], gateway to both clerical and secular careers." At Salamanca, "by the late 17th century, law students outnumbered theologians by twenty to one." He concluded that "the old, popular assertion that a one-sided, conservative preoccupation with theology thwarted educational and scientific progress in Spain and her universities is not borne out by the matriculation lists."
24 Given the role of lawyers in the royal bureaucracy, anyone who wished to influence Spanish policy toward the Americas would be inclined to employ legal arguments and vocabulary simply in order to speak to officials in their customary language.
The core of the canon law consisted of two volumes that first appeared in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. The first, Gratian's Decretum (ca. 1140), was a textbook designed "to reconcile differing canonical traditions and prescriptions into an intellectually consistent and unified system." The second, the Decretales (1234), was a compilation of decisions in cases that had reached the papal court. These decisions often "resemble, at least roughly, modern appellate court decisions" and were considered of sufficient importance as to merit study in the law schools. 25 This was the most important of all the volumes of canon law. Several small collections of papal decisions published in later centuries were of less importance. After the texts were edited in accordance with humanist principles, they were published as the Corpus Iuris Canonici in 1582.
In addition to the texts themselves, there was also an extensive body of commentary on the decisions with which the practising lawyers would be acquainted. The earliest commentaries were glosses on individual words and phrases, but gradually the canon lawyers began to produce what were in effect small treatises on a variety of topics considered relevant to the orderly direction of Christian society. These treatises, however, did not evolve into full-fledged theoretical treatises on political and legal matters as one might have expected. In the course of commenting on both the Decretum and the Decretales the canon lawyers considered the relations of Christian societies with non-Christian ones from several perspectives. The first, and probably best known, perspective was the theory of the just war, that is the formal examination of the circumstances under which Christians could legitimately wage war. 27 For example, did Christians have the right to attack an infidel society simply because its inhabitants were infidels. . 28 In effect, this issue revolved around the question of whether legitimate possession and exercise of dominium depended upon being in the state of grace. This debate in turn led to a discussion of whether all mankind, not only Christians, possessed certain rights, above all the right to dominium, suggesting that the notion of human rights is not a modern one, created in the seventeenth or the eighteenth centuries. This line of research suggests instead that in fact the roots of theories of human rights go back to the medieval philosophical tradition and to then to the canon lawyers who appear to be the first thinkers to raise the issue of human rights.
29
The great debate about the legitimacy of the conquest of the Americas, Hanke's "struggle for justice", began with the application of traditional medieval legal arguments about the just war and about the right of the inhabitants of the Americas to dominium. These arguments appeared in scholarly treatises such as Vitoria's De Indis and in polemical literature such as the writings of Bartolome de Las Casas.
30 A careful analysis of these works reveals the authors' reliance upon the medieval legal tradition. Specifically, these writers drew upon a body of commentary written on one papal decretal letter, the letter Quod super his (Decretales 3.34.8), a decision of Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) in a case involving a man who had vowed to go on crusade and then claimed that circumstances made it impossible for him to do so. In his decision, the pope simply declared that the man should fulfil his vow in some other way such as paying the expenses of someone else to go on crusade.
Some years later, Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254), a noted canon lawyer, wrote a commentary on this decretal that paid little attention to the actual details of the case and instead raised the broad question of why the pope could authorise a crusade at all. In the course of this commentary, Innocent IV presented, apparently for the first time, the theory that all mankind, Christian and non-Christian alike, possessed the right to dominium so that Christians had no general right to invade Muslim lands and occupy them. Christians could, however, employing the principles of the just war, seek to regain possession of lands that the Muslims had taken from Christians in earlier times in presumably unjust wars, thus justifying the crusades to regain the Holy Land but not providing a legal basis for conquering other Muslim-held lands.
Although Innocent IV's opinion that infidels did possess legitimate dominium became the standard position within the canon law tradition, it did not go unchallenged. One of his students, Henry de Segusio (d. 1270), generally known as Hostiensis, normally a strong supporter of his master's views argued that with the Incarnation, dominium depended on grace so that only Christians could legitimately hold property and self government, although in reality this was de iure and not de facto. This theory would justify Christian conquest of any territory possessed by any non-Christians. Parry, for example, concluded that Hostiensis's argument that dominium rested on being in the state of grace was the dominant view among the canonists. 31 The canonists in fact, however, rejected this position as being associated with the ancient Donatisi heresy that had been revived in the writings of the condemned heretics John Wyclif and John Hus. 32 Subsequent canonists as well as other writers on legal topics during the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries drew upon these commentaries, probably by way of Johannes Andreae's compilation, because it provided all of the arguments in a convenient form. Any subsequent discussion of the rights of non-Christians visa-vis Christians was thus couched in the terms that Innocent IV and Hostiensis had set. At the Council of Constance (1414-1417) lawyers representing the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of Poland debated the legitimacy of the Teutonic Knights' conquest Lithuania in these terms. 33 Likewise, the letters that various popes issued during the fifteenth century in support of the Portuguese and Castilian occupation of parts of West Africa and the island chains of the Atlantic echoed the legal theories of the canonists. 34 The Americas were initially perceived as other islands of the coast of Europe and Africa so that the arguments employed by the Portuguese and the Castilians to occupy them would seem to have been applicable to the Americas. 35 Thus, it should come as no surprise that when Spanish intellectuals began to consider the legitimacy of the conquest of the New World, they did so in terms of the legal justifications for conquest that had been developed since the mid-thirteenth century and that had been employed by Pope Alexander VI (1492) (1493) (1494) (1495) (1496) (1497) (1498) (1499) (1500) (1501) (1502) (1503) outlines of the work that needs to be done. It is clear, for example, that scholars such as Vitoria and polemicists such as Las Casas presented their positions of the legitimacy of the conquest in traditional canonistic terms. It is also clear that the roots of modern notions of human rights are to be found in this tradition. Finally, Hugo Grotius's judgment of his predecessors learning was erroneous. It was possible to develop a conception of international law out of the medieval and sixteenth-century traditions that could serve as an alternative to Grotius's conception. 
